Alexander Hoppe

Media attention on the European Union (EU) is primarily directed towards large, high-profile issues such as Brexit and the 2015 migration crisis. However, this is not the core of what the EU does. Officials and politicians in Brussels are mainly occupied with legislation. In most cases, these laws are negotiated within the framework of the Ordinary Legislative Procedure between the European Commission, the European Parliament (EP), and the Council of the European Union. Although the Lisbon Treaty prescribes a complex system of three readings in these institutions for this standard procedure, it has been replaced increasingly over the last two decades by so-called “trilogues”: an informal institutional setting in which the relevant institutions negotiate behind closed doors. Between 2014 and 2019, 99% of laws within the Ordinary Legislative Procedure were adopted via “early agreements” after the first reading or early in the second reading phase. Consequently, they are the result of negotiations in trilogues.

Initially, the term “trilogue” described the actual meeting between representatives of the institutions. However, it now often encompasses, including in this dissertation, the entire negotiation process. This process begins with the granting of a formal mandate by the institutions and ends with a draft agreement, which finally must be approved by the full EP and the Council. Given that trilogues occupy a central place in the daily work of EU officials and politicians, it is surprising that knowledge about them remains very limited. In fact, the trilogue phenomenon is primarily known as a “black box”: an opaque, institutional procedure taking place behind closed doors that offers little to no insight to those not directly involved.

Research on trilogues over the last two decades has provided significant insights, yet many questions remain, particularly regarding the negotiation process. This dissertation contributes to bringing these negotiation processes out of the shadows and demonstrates how they occur and influence the resulting legislation.

The book consists of 10 chapters divided into three parts. Part one introduces the research question, theoretical framework, and methodology. Part two contains the empirical analysis, presented in four different case studies. Part three summarizes the empirical findings, answers the main research question, and shows the implications for other academic questions as well as political-administrative practice. Finally, all chapters are briefly summarized and the key insights explained.

Part 1 – Introduction, Theory, and Method
This thesis focuses on the negotiation process in trilogues and investigates to what extent the final result, European legislation, is influenced by the way negotiations unfold. The main research question is: How does the negotiation process in trilogues affect the outcomes of legislative processes in the Ordinary Legislative Procedure?
To answer this, the thesis explores three sub-questions concerning social interaction between actors, institutional structures/venues used, and the negotiation approaches/strategies observed.

Chapter 1 introduces these questions, while Chapter 2 reviews existing research on trilogues across six research streams (evolution, reasons for choosing trilogues, systemic consequences, intra-institutional adaptation, democratic quality, and procedural aspects).

Chapter 3 sets out the theoretical framework, identifying four indicators for the comprehensiveness of an outcome: (a) inclusion of original positions, (b) actor satisfaction, (c) legal weight of positions, and (d) legal soundness. It conceptualizes trilogues through interaction intensity, institutional venues, and negotiation modes, leading to nine testable hypotheses.

Chapter 4 introduces the methodology of process tracing used to analyze four case studies chosen based on power relations and file salience.

Part 2 – Empirical Research
Chapters 5 through 8 analyze four cases: Autonomous trade measures for Ukraine, Posting of workers directive, Type approval and market surveillance of motor vehicles, and the Governance of the energy union regulation.

In the Ukraine case (Chapter 5), low interaction intensity and lack of coalition-building led to a confrontational negotiation mode and low inclusion of original positions, though legal quality remained high due to the file's simplicity. In the Posting of Workers case (Chapter 6), high interaction intensity led to informalization, but cooperative modes in informal arenas did not transfer to political trilogues, limiting position inclusion while maintaining actor satisfaction. The Type Approval case (Chapter 7) utilized all venues and showed high trust and cooperative behavior in technical and informal settings, leading to high quality on both political and legal levels. The Energy Union Governance case (Chapter 8) largely confirmed that interaction intensity and underlying positions influenced negotiation modes and venue choice, resulting in high legal quality.

Part 3 – Findings
Chapters 9 and 10 provide a summary analysis and answer the research question. The study identifies three causal links coupling the negotiation process to the result. First, interaction intensity between chief negotiators leads to informalization, which shifts negotiations to a more cooperative mode and increases the inclusion of original positions. Second, delegation to lower hierarchical levels changes the negotiation mode to be more cooperative, increasing the legal weight of original positions. Third, delegation to lower levels improves legal soundness because actors spend more time on negotiations and possess greater technical knowledge.

In conclusion, this analysis demonstrates that the negotiation process indeed influences the outcome. Particularly, delegation to lower and more informal arenas is shown to be exceptionally important. While the “black box” of trilogues is not entirely removed, this research replaces uncertainty with valuable insights grounded in practice, providing a basis for further exploration of EU negotiations.