Leon van Rijsbergen
What Do You Think You’re Doing?
Despite its enormous influence, Immanuel Kant's moral philosophy has been widely criticized as 'overly abstract.' Specifically, Kant's central claim that moral duties are universal commands of pure practical reason, allowing no exceptions, is seen by many as an indication that his moral philosophy is excessively detached from what might be called 'moral practice.' Over the years, Kantian philosophers have responded to many such criticisms. However, insufficient attention has been paid to a related category of criticism that problematizes the potential of Kant's moral philosophy in light of what can be described as cultural pluralism. A substantial number of philosophers accuse Kant (and/or Kantians) of having built a universalist moral system based on a homogeneous, 'Eurocentric' conception of morality and/or the moral agent.
In this dissertation, I investigate whether Kant's universalist moral philosophy can accommodate cultural pluralism in a satisfactory manner. In four independent chapters, I aim to show that, within Kant's moral system, both ethical and juridical evaluation of an action must attend to the agent's maxim, and should not be limited to the 'outward manifestation' of their action. I argue that this insight is crucial for understanding how both Kant's supreme moral principle and his universal principle of right can positively accommodate substantially different local ways of life—and thus cultural pluralism.
In Chapter 1, I discuss Katrin Flikschuh's 'contextualist' interpretation of Kant's ethics. According to Flikschuh's Kantian contextualism, Kant's supreme moral principle allows for different (even mutually exclusive) local moralities, because the categorical imperative test is not intended to provide insight into objective moral truth, but as a test with which we evaluate the purity of our maxims. According to Flikschuh, when we sincerely and well-meaningly judge that our maxim can be willed as a universal law, we have done everything that Kantian morality can reasonably demand of us. Once we recognize that people navigate their lives through various conceptual frameworks formed by the specific social circumstances of their locally realized ways of life, we can see that individuals in different social contexts can rightfully consider certain maxims as universalizable, even when we cannot do so from our own local standpoint. At least, so Flikschuh argues. In response, I argue that Flikschuh's Kantian contextualism results in normative indeterminacy, misinterprets the role of the categorical imperative test within Kant's ethics, and places actors in a theoretically incoherent position where they must judge whether their maxims are universalizable, while simultaneously having to recognize that such judgments do not determine whether their maxims can actually be willed as universal laws. In contrast, I state that Kant's ethics offers ample opportunities for cultural pluralism without having to distance itself from the idea that the categorical imperative imposes unconditional, universal constraints on action, since imperfect duties can only be applied against the background of contextual circumstances and require practical judgment from contextually situated actors for their fulfillment. Furthermore, the object of perfect duties—actions—cannot be strictly decoupled from maxims, and thus from the concrete contextual circumstances in which an action is willed.
In Chapter 2, I respond to David Velleman's argument that Kant's categorical imperative is unsuitable as a universal moral principle because it is a principle to which only a select (thus not universal) group of people is committed. According to Velleman, 'Kantian actors' necessarily act with the goal of realizing their autonomy, which they do by bringing their actions into agreement with the requirements of the categorical imperative. He further argues that anthropological data shows that certain groups of people—such as the Sherpa of Nepal, the Baining and Kaluli of Papua New Guinea, and the Ilongot of the Philippines—do not share Kant's 'psychologized' characterization of agency, as a result of which it cannot be said that his constitutive standard applies to them, which Kant would understand as the categorical imperative. I reject Velleman's thesis by showing that someone, in order to act under any specific self-conception at all, must always implicitly understand themselves as a 'Kantian actor' (i.e., as someone who necessarily acts under the idea of freedom). Moreover, I argue that Kant's categorical imperative should not be understood as a constitutive standard of action. Velleman therefore fails to show that the categorical imperative cannot be a moral principle that is universally applicable to rational actors.
In Chapter 3, I investigate Kant's alleged judgment on the historical practice of senicide among the Inuit (i.e., the killing of the elderly at their request), because I believe this illustrates the context-sensitivity inherent to his moral philosophy. In his lectures on ethics, Kant is reported to have said that this practice was a 'loving service' (Liebesdienst) by children to their parents that was justified to a certain extent, since its goal was to protect the elderly from starvation—a fate he refers to as a 'more ignominious death.' This statement is puzzling because Kant repeatedly proclaims that suicide (Selbstmord) is unconditionally excluded by the categorical imperative. This raises the question of whether—and if so, how—these assertions can be reconciled with each other. By analyzing what Kant possibly meant by an 'ignominious death,' I conclude that he may plausibly have meant that an (assisted) act of self-killing does not count as a case of suicide when it is necessary to prevent one from dying under circumstances that are incompatible with the dignity of a rational being, or that are 'more ignominious' than the alternative of enduring one's life to its natural end. If my argument is correct, I show that Kant's moral philosophy leaves room for the possibility that (cultural) context influences the question of whether an action or practice involving (assisted) self-killing counts as a violation of the categorical prohibition on suicide. If this applies to suicide, then the same should apply to actions in general.
In Chapter 4, I discuss the dominant view according to which Kant's philosophy of right, in contrast to his ethics, is exclusively concerned with the question of whether an action actually infringes upon someone's conditions of external freedom, regardless of the maxim on which the action is willed. I argue that this interpretation forms a problem for Kant's theory, as it cannot distinguish between actions that are outwardly similar but internally different. This problem is particularly pressing in the context of cultural pluralism, as cultural-anthropological data shows that certain culture-specific forms of action, although outwardly indistinguishable from unlawful actions such as lying or making false promises, do not carry the same connotations of deception that according to Kant undermine a state based on the rule of law. If Kant's universal principle of right cannot distinguish between outwardly similar but substantively different actions, it is susceptible to assessing rightful actions as contrary to right. In response, I show that Kant's philosophy of right is equally concerned with maxims as with the 'outward manifestation' of actions. I do this by defending Marie Newhouse's two-standard interpretation of Kant's universal principle of right against the prevailing view that this principle does not apply to maxims. Subsequently, I show that Newhouse's two-standard interpretation allows that certain external actions qualify as rightful precisely because they can be recognizably performed on a maxim that is in accordance with right. Culture, I argue, plays a formative role in determining the standards by which the outward characteristics of certain actions can be assessed as compatible with Kant's notion of universal freedom under laws. This shows that Kant's theory of right has the means to positively accommodate different local ways of life—not by weakening its universal principle, but by allowing cultural context to be taken into account in the identification of rightful types of action.
Together, the chapters show that Kant's universalist moral system, because of its focus on the normative status of maxims instead of outward actions as such, has the means to positively accommodate cultural pluralism. According to the Kantian view, the moral and juridical status of an action or cultural practice is inextricably linked to what the person understands themselves to be doing when performing it. A cultural practice is morally and juridically permissible as long as it can be recognizably performed on maxims that can simultaneously be willed as universal laws and do not infringe upon the external freedom of others. Whether certain outward actions or practices can be performed on such maxims is culture-dependent. Since the maxim on which an action or practice is willed can influence the question of whether it qualifies as a certain type of (im)permissible action or practice, Kant's moral system allows that outwardly similar but substantively different cultural practices can differ in moral status. This applies both to practices concerning speech acts and practices encompassing physical actions. Therefore, Kant's moral system should not be understood as a dogmatic or culturally parochial framework limited to—or only leaving room for—'European' ways of life, but veeleer as a moral theory that can be applied flexibly across diverse cultural contexts.
| Publicatiedatum | 17 september 2026 |
| Universiteit | Rijksuniversiteit Groningen |
| Auteur | Leon van Rijsbergen |